Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Journal Articles

Publications

1998

Regulating the Use of Force in the 21st Century: The Continuing
Importance of State Autonomy
Mary Ellen O'Connell
Notre Dame Law School, maryellenoconnell@nd.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mary Ellen O'Connell, Regulating the Use of Force in the 21st Century: The Continuing Importance of State
Autonomy, 36 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 473 (1998).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/96

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please
contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Regulating the Use of Force
in the 21 st Century:
The Continuing Importance
of State Autonomy
MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The most important, and certainly the most ambitious, modification of international law in this century has been the outlawing of the
use of force to settle international disputes. The definitive prohibition
on the use of force came with the adoption of the United Nations
Charter and, in particular, Charter article 2(4).' Louis Henkin has
written:
Article 2(4) is the most important norm of international law,
the distillation and embodiment of the primary value of the
inter-State system, the defence of State independence and
State autonomy. The Charter contemplated no exceptions.
It prohibits the use of force for selfish State interests ("vital
interests") as well as for benign purposes, human values. It
declares peace as the supreme value, to secure not merely
State autonomy, but fundamental order for all. It declares
peace to be more compelling than inter-State justice, more
compelling even than human rights or other human values.2
For a short while, from 1991 until 1994, it appeared that a majority
of Security Council members had re-interpreted the Charter's order of
priorities. To some, it seemed that the Council had placed such values
as human rights, self-determination, and even democracy above the

* Professor, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. The views
expressed herein are the author's own and not necessarily those of the United States
government. Copyright © Mary Ellen O'Connell, 1997.
1. "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER, done atSan
Francisco, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, ay amended 24 U.S.T.
2225, T.I.A.S. 7739 art. 2, para. 4.
2. Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS, VALUES AND FUNCIONS 146 (1990).
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value of peace through respect for State autonomy.3 A careful examination does not support the conclusion that the Security Council accomplished a real re-ordering. However, to the extent that Security Council
members may have moved away from the traditional interpretation of
the Charter, restated above by Henkin, they have now returned. The
experiment with re-ordering priorities has ended. Peace through respect
for State autonomy has again, for better or worse, returned as the
primary value. This article examines the period of reinterpretation:
1991-1994. Section two begins by confirming Henkin's observation
that the Charter was designed to enshrine preservation of the peace as
the supreme value of the international community, even at the expense
of other values. As Henkin points out, preserving the peace was thought
to support State autonomy and, more importantly, fundamental order for
all. As noted by Henkin in the quotation above, the drafters of the
Charter believed that respecting State autonomy could guarantee peace.
Section two aims to link this ordering of values more directly to the
Security Council and States. Section three then looks closely at the
significant events of the period of Security Council activism, which
some believe changed the original Charter design. The result of the
analysis in this article, however, finds that on only one occasion, in the
case of Haiti, did the Security Council unambiguously re-interpret the
plain words of the Charter. This re-interpretationhas not been repeated.
The conclusion here is that, at least through the beginning of the 21st
century, the Security Council will continue to respect the value of State
autonomy in its efforts to keep the peace.
II.

THE CHARTER CONCEPT

The Charter's rules on use of force may be divided into three
categories: rules governing the use of force by individual States; rules

3. "In the Post-Charter Self-Help paradigm, justice is valued above peace. States are
claiming the right to use force to promote certain 'just' goals. The major difficulty with this
formulation is that different groups of states have offered differing and often contradictory
definitions of what a 'just' goal is .... Specifically, it could be argued that in light of recent
developments, there is a consensus that it is proper to use force to promote democratic selfdetermination in the western sense of the term." ANTHONY C. AREND & ROBERT J. BECK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 191-92 (1993). See also John Stremlau,
SharpeningInternationalSanctions, Toward a StrongerRole for the UnitedNations, A REPORT
TO THE CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON PREVENTING DEADLY CONFLICT 17 (1996); Jarat Chopra &
Thomas G. Weiss, Sovereignty is No Longer Sacrosanct:Codifying HumanitarianIntervention,
6 ETHICS & INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 95, 97 (1992/3).
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governing the use of force by the Security Council; and rules governing
the use of force by regional organizations. In the classical interpretation
of each of these sets of rules we see the effort to protect State autonomy.
A.

IndividualStates

For the individual State, article 2(4) ofthe Charter prohibits the use
of force except in self-defense against an actual armed attack, and even
then only until the Security Council acts.4 This rule provides ultimate
protection for State autonomy-no State may be threatened by another
State's decision to use force. Regardless of a State's violations of
international law, it cannot be attacked by another State unless the
violator State has attacked first. States have not opposed or attempted
to reinterpret this basic principle since the Charter's adoption. For the
most part, States have reinforced the principle. The International Court
of Justice, in a case brought by Nicaragua against the United States in
1986,' authoritatively demonstrated the continuing vitality of article
2(4) in its original form. The Court confirmed that under international
law States may only use force when responding to an actual armed
attack. The Court stated that shipments of weapons from one State to
rebels fighting the government of another State would not amount to an
armed attack. This finding is consistent with the Definition of Aggression,6 which lists actions equivalent to an armed attack.7 According to
article 3(g) of the Definition, an armed attack which triggers the right
to use force includes: invasion of territory, bombardment of territory,
blockade of ports, attack on air, sea, or land forces, and the "sending.
of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out

4. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately
reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility
of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems
necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER,
supranote 1, art. 51.
5. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
6. See G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A19631
(1974).
7. See HILAIRE McCouBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED

CONFLICT 51-52 (1992).
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acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount
to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement therein."'
While States have not challenged the core principle of article 2(4),
some States have from time to time pressed for exceptions. For
example, the drafters of the Definition of Aggression included a clear
exception to the generally accepted meaning of 2(4). In article 7, the
Definition says that the right of self-determination, particularly by
peoples under "colonial and racist regimes or other forms of alien
domination," is not intended to be limited by the Definition and neither
is the "right of these peoples to struggle ...

and to seek and receive

support .... ." This exception remains controversial. It certainly tended
to undermine the autonomy of former colonial powers such as France
and the United Kingdom. The United States, in particular, doubted its
legality. Today, the chief sponsors of the exception argue that it is no
longer relevant since the days of colonialism and apartheid are over.
The States of the developing world, particularly in Africa, have spoken
strongly in favor of the value of autonomy and have always considered
the application of article 7 to be limited.9
Another much-discussedexceptionto the prohibition on the use of
force is the right to rescue nationals. In the 1970s, terrorists captured a
jet carrying mostly Israeli citizens. Uganda allowed the plane to land
at its Entebbe airport, then proceeded to assist the terrorists. Ugandan
army personnel held Israeli passengers on the plane to pressure Israel
into accepting the terrorists' demands. 10 Israel flew a specially-trained
unit to Entebbe where, with a minimal use of force (small arms, rather
than major weapons systems), the passengers were rescued and flown
out of the airport. This action met with general international approval.
However, it is the only example of its kind. No doubt if another
incident of the same nature occurred, a similar rescue would also not be
condemned, but whether the Entebbe rescue alone can be said to have
created an exception to article 2(4) is legally hard to conclude.1

8. G.A. Res. 3314, supranote 6, at 143.
9. One sees the limitation quite clearly in, for example, The Charter of the Organizatioh
of African Unity, done at Addis Ababa, May 25, 1963, art. 3, 2 I.L.M. 766 (1963).
10. A. MARK WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRACTICE OF STATES SINCE WORLD WAR

11276-78 (1997).
11. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see THOMAS EHRLICH & MARY ELLEN
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (1993); HENKIN, supranote 2, 142-

62; Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 37 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991); Oscar Schachter, The
Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1624-27 (1984).
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States have not pressed during the period under review for any
other exceptions, although some scholars have. 2 A few international
lawyers have argued that individual States should have the right to
intervene militarily to enforce international human rights law. They
argue that the United Nations Charter promotes both peace and human
rights and that we should not give the peace rules priority over human
rights rules by limiting the enforcement powers of States. 3 This
argument cannot withstand legal scrutiny. While the Charter's human
rights provisions are aspirational and future-oriented, article 2(4) is
emphatic and unconditional. 14
Re-ordering these priorities requires re-interpretation, at the least,
of current Charter language. Some argue that, despite the current
language, as long as the Security Council has not acted to fulfill its
duties under the Charter, individual States may so act.15 While it is clear
that the Council has not fulfilled many of its obligations under the
Charter, it is not clear that it is obliged to use force in the enforcement
of human rights law. This question will be discussed below. Should it
be determined that the Council does have this obligation, it is not a
logical continuation to say that the responsibility can be assumed by
individual States. The Council is a multilateral body, with its authority
to act granted by treaty. A single State cannot assume this authority in
contravention of the rules binding individual States. Most importantly,
there is no State practice to support this argument. No State has ever
argued that it has the right to act in lieu of the Security Council.
Some proponents of a right of humanitarian intervention cite the
Tanzanian invasion of Uganda, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia,
and the Indian invasion of West Pakistan as examples. 6 In fact, neither
Vietnam nor Tanzaniajustified their invasions as humanitarian. To the
extent that India did, its intervention was internationally condemned. 7

12. See discussion in HENiN, supranote 2, at 150-54.
13. See, e.g., FERNANDO R. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW
AND MORALITY 138-41 (1988); Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect
Human Rights: Recent Views from the United Nations, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND
THE UNITED NATIONS 200, 200-01 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973) (appendix).
14. See EHRLICH & O'CONNELL, supra note 11, at 306, 328.
15. See id.
16. See Richard B. Lillich, HumanitarianIntervention:A Reply to Dr. Brownlie and a
Pleafor ConstructiveAlternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229, 24451 (John Norton Moore ed. 1974).
17. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, Enforcingthe Prohibitionon the Use ofForce: The U.N. "s
Response to Iraq s Invasion ofKuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 474-75 (1991).
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The most common use of force by States across international
boundaries since the adoption of the Charter has been the sending of
troops at the request of governments. France, for example, has sent
intervention forces to Africa every other year on average. The United
States justified its interventions in Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, El
Salvador, and the Dominican Republic as requests by the governments
for assistance. The Soviet Union justified its interventions in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Afghanistan as requests by the governments. If
a request creates a lawful exception, it must of course be a legitimate
request by a government in effective control of a State. We know that
the requests to intervene in Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, Afghanistan,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary lacked some or all of these requirements.
Therefore, the interventions were not lawful exceptions to article 2(4).
Where a lawful request has been made in the event of an armed
attack on a State, article 51 contemplates collective as well as individual
self-defense. As for cases in which a government in effective control of
a State actually made a legitimate request for assistance in the case of
civil war, there is even some question whether these were lawful
interventions. On the one hand, governments may consent to or request
the presence of foreign troops in peace time. There is probably no
question about such troops participating in policing or riot control. But
on the other hand, when an organized group seeks to overthrow a
government or secede from a State, the use of foreign troops against
them raises the question whether the rebels' right of self-determination
is restricted. According to Doswald-Beck:
It is submitted that there is, at the least, a very serious doubt
whether a State may validly aid another government to
suppress a rebellion, particularly if the rebellion is widespread and seriously aimed at the overthrowof the incumbent
regime. The combinationof [General Assembly] Resolutions
213 1(XX) and 2625(XXV), taking into account the motivation behind these resolutions, of the fact that States justify
such interventions on the basis of prior outside intervention,
and of the number of statements stressing true independence,
self-determination and non-intervention in internal affairs,
provides substantial evidence to support a theory that
intervention to prop up a beleaguered government is illegal."8

18. Louise Doswald-Beck, The Legal Validity of MilitaryInterventionby Invitation of the
Government, 56 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 189,251 (1985).
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Military aid to the rebels themselves is self-evidently unlawful,
except perhaps, as described above, to rebels seeking to overthrow
colonialist or racist regimes. The International Court of Justice found,
however, that the provision of humanitarian aid, even to rebels, is not
unlawful under international law. 9 It also found that low-level
provision of assistance to rebels, in the form of limited shipments of
conventional weapons, while an unlawful interference in the internal
affairs of the victim State, could not be considered an armed attack.
Therefore, such assistance does not trigger the right to use force in selfdefense in the territory of another State and afortioridoes not trigger
the right of collective self-defense. States may use force in self-defense
if, and only if, an armed attack occurs.2 °
The Court also found that any lawful provision of assistance in
effective self-defense can only occur after a formal request by the
government. The United States failed to produce evidence that El
Salvador had ever formally requested U.S. assistance to counter
Nicaraguan aid to rebels in El Salvador. The Court found that without
such a request, even if the other facts of the case were as the U.S.
argued, the U.S. could not legally use force against Nicaragua.
It would have been helpful to the law if the Court had more clearly
defined "armed attack" under international law. As discussed above, it
ruled out low-level shipments of weapons, but did not address terror
campaigns, assassinations, or attempted assassination of heads of state
or former heads of state. It would also have been helpful if it had said
something definitive about anticipatory self-defense. There seems to be
no reason not to use the formula of the Caroline Doctrine, according to
which a government may use force in anticipation of an armed attack if
the "necessity of that self-defence, is instant, overwhelming,
and leaving
21
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.1
In summary, under the Charter as drafted and under the practice of
the first fifty years after the adoption of the Charter, States could
employ force under only one rule of international law: in self-defense.
For part of this period, States might also have been permitted to use
force to help realize the right of self-determination by peoples under
colonial or racist domination. The legal right of States to challenge each
others' autonomy for any reason by the use of force was eliminated with
the adoption of the Charter.
19. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. US), 1986
I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
20. See EHRLICH & O'CONNELL, supra note 11, at 344.
21. JOHN B. MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 412 (1906).
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The UnitedNations

The United Nations operates under a different set of rules than
individual States. The Security Council was given broader authority to
use force: it could respond to threats of aggression as well as to breaches
of internationalpeace. But the Charter does not explicitly authorize the
use of force to enforce other values. Thus, article 24(1) outlines the
Council's mandate:
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary
responsibility for the maintenance of internationalpeaceand
security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.22
Article 39 provides that:
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures
shall be taken in accordance with articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore internationalpeace andsecurity.23
Finally, the Charter explicitly restricts responses to violent conflict
within States in article 2(7):
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require
the members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice 24
the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
When the Security Council finds a threat to or breach of international peace or other act of aggression, it may order or recommend, per
article 41, the use of measures short of force, including "interruption of

22. U.N. CHARTER supra note 1,art. 24, para. 1 (emphasis added).
23. U.N. CHARTER supra note 1,art. 39 (emphasis added).
24. U.N. CHARTER supra note 1, art. 2, para. 7. Some have argued that this reference to
Chapter VII permits the Security Council to take action in domestic situations. See, e.g.,
Winrich Ktlhne, Vdlkerrecht und Friedenssicherungin einer turbulenten Welt: Eine analytische
Zusammenfassungder Grundproblemeund Entwicklungsperspektiven 17,28 in BLAUHELME
IN EINER TURULENTEN WELT (Winrich Ktihne ed., 1993). This reading, however, is
inconsistent with the words of Chapter VII itself, which limits Security Council action to
responses to threats or breaches of international peace. Where there is a mixed conflict
involving international peace and domestic affairs, the Security Council could act and it is to
these situations that article 2(7) is referring. See MCCOUBREY & WHrrE, supranote 7, at 73-74.
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economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations." Should these measures prove inadequate, the Council may
under article 42 "take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore internatioral peace and security."
These forces were supposed to have been made available to the Council
on the basis of pre-existing agreements established under article 43.
The agreements were supposed to provide for troops that would be
available on an urgent basis (article 45), and there was also to be a
military staff committee to advise the Council about the preparation of
and use of the troops (article 47).
The article 43 agreements were never implemented nor has the
Military Staff Committee ever advised the Security Council. Thus,
despite all of the conflict during the years after the adoption of the
Charter and before the end of the Cold War, the Council only declared
threats to internationalpeace four times. It ordered economic sanctions
against Rhodesia and South Africa and ordered troops to Korea and the
Congo.25
Thus, as stated above, the Security Council's authority to use force
is broader than that of individual States. It has the right to respond to
threats as well as to actual breaches of"internationalpeace" and acts of
aggression.
By "international peace," however, it is understood here that the
drafters of the Charter meant to restrict the Council's authority to
intervene in civil war despite such wars being breaches of "peace." As
mentioned above, article 39 refers to the Council's right to take
measures only in response to breaches of internationalpeace, and
article 2(7) plainly states that the internal affairs of members are out-ofbounds for the Organization. This limitation is consistent with the
Charter's preservation of the "autonomy" value. Civil war has always
been viewed as an internal matter. Indeed, before democracy's current
popularity, it was a typical way many States changed governments. The
drafters did not give the Organization the ability to dictate the outcome
of such typical struggles.2 6 Finally, there was no indication from the
practice of the Organization that it could so intervene. The closest the
U.N. has come to intervening in a civil war was in the Congo in 1960.
The Security Council initially authorized U.N. intervention to counter
Belgian intervention on the eve of Congolese independence. The U.N.,
25. See generally GEORGES ABI-SAAB, INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW:
THE UNrrED NATIONS OPERAnTON IN THE CONGO 1960-1964 (1978).
26. See HENKIN, supra note 2, at 165-67.
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however, ended up fighting alongside the central government against
the people of Katanga province who were attempting to secede. The
U.N. endeavored to remain neutral but could not and, thus, tipped the
balance against those striving to secede.27
The Security Council's actual observation of the legal restrictions
on interventionin civil conflicts was aided by the Cold War competition
between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War meant
that a decision by the Council to use force was generally viewed as
favoring or disfavoring one side or another. As so characterized, a veto
was inevitable. The intervention in Korea could only occur because at
the time of the North's invasion, the Soviet Union was boycotting the
Council.28 In the Congo, the General Assembly called for the sending
of volunteers, which the French and the Soviets both called a contravention of the Charter.29 They refused to pay the expenses associated with
the Congo action. This resulted in the establishment of a separate
account for peacekeeping expenses, to be paid voluntarily."
Indeed, the problem of getting Security Council consensus, despite
the clear interest and desire of the international community to respond
to conflicts, led to the development of "peacekeeping." The term
peacekeeping dpes not appear in the Charter. The Council has no
express authority to send peacekeepers. But U.N. lawyers have always
argued that as long as peacekeeping actions have the consent of all the
parties to the particular conflict, act impartially, carry only defensive
weapons, and intervene only following a cease-fire, there could be no
real legal challenge to their deployment. Under Chapter VI of the
Charter, the Security Council has authority to recommend to States a
variety of measures for peaceful settlement of disputes and under
Chapter VII it can send troops of the member States to conflict areas.

27. See NIGEL D. WH=TE, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SEcuRrrY 50-51 (1990). See generallyABI-SAAB, supra note 25.

28. When the Soviet Union returned to the Council, the U.S. tried to devise an end run
around the Council using its many allies in the General Assembly. In November 1950, the
Assembly adopted the Unitingfor Peace resolution, which gave it power to discuss and make
recommendations on matters of peace and security if the Council found itself deadlocked.
Members were also to hold armed forces ready in the event that the Council failed to act. The
Uniting for Peace resolution was first used in 1954 when the U.K. and France vetoed Security
Council resolutions during the Suez crisis. Following a General Assembly demand to do so,
those two countries did withdraw their troops. But the Soviet Union did not in 1956, when it
was called upon to pull its troops out of Hungary. See generally ROBERT R. BOWIE,
INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW: SUEZ 1956 (1974).

29. See id.
30. See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 151, 156 (July 20).
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Putting these provisions together, international lawyers believe the
authority can be found.
Before the end of the Cold War, seventeen peacekeeping missions
were organized. These missions aided compliance with cease-fires by
literally imposing blue-helmeted soldiers between warring factions or
setting up observer posts to report breaches of the cease-fire. Peacekeepers were not, however, peace enforcers-they could not take
coercive action to compel compliance with a cease-fire. 1
C.

Regional Organizations

According to article 53(1):
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such
regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action
under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken
under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without
the authorization of the Security Council .... 32
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
considers itself to be such a regional organization. The North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) apparently does not. 33 Thus, article 5 of
the North Atlantic Treaty,34 which is similar to article 4 of the old
Warsaw Treaty,35 states:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an
attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if
such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the
right of individual or collective self-defense recognized in
article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked ....
When acting in self-defense, NATO would still require the authority of
the right of individual or collective self defense under article 51. Nonself-defensive actions, like those undertaken by the Implementation
31. For a comprehensive discussion of peacekeeping under international law, see WHITE,
supra note 27, at 172-76.
32 U.N. CHARTER, supranote 1, art. 53(1).
33. See Willem Van Eekelen, The Security,Agendafor 1996: Background andProposals,
9 CENTER FOR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES (CEPS Paper No. 64, 1995).

34. North Atlantic Treaty, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 43 AM. J. INT'L L., Supp. 159 (1949).
35. The Warsaw Pact, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 194 (1955).
36. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 34, art. 5.
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Force for Bosnia (IFOR), would clearly require Security Council
authorization under article 53. NATO's first actions did not occur until
the end of the Cold War, and in all those cases upon a request or
authorization by the Security Council.37
III. A PERIOD OF ACTIVISM
With the end of the Cold War, the veto ceased to be a problem.
The U.N. Security Council was able to respond more closely to the
original plan of the Charter when, by unanimous vote, it found that Iraq
had violated article 2(4) by its invasion of Kuwait. The Council did not,
however, authorize its own force, but rather, akin to the action in Korea,
it authorized a coalition of national forces under United States command
to respond to the aggression.
Had the Security Council failed to act promptly, the coalition
might have invoked article 51, if requested by Kuwait. Under that
article, the victim of such a clear case of armed aggression may request
the help of other States, pending Security Council action. In this
instance, however, the Security Council played an active role, as
contemplated by the Charter. Viewing the events following the Iraqi
invasion, it will be seen that the Security Council then began pressing
the limits of its authority, only to return to a more conservativeposition
by 1994.
A.

The Iraqi Exclusion Zone

It was with the establishment of the Iraqi Exclusion Zone that the
international community saw the first indication of a new attitude
towards the Charter by the Security Council. At the end of February
1991, as the fighting to liberate Kuwait was ending, the Kurds of
northern Iraq began a rebellion against the Iraqi government, apparently
either to secede from Iraq or at least to establish an autonomous Kurdish
region.38
This development seems to have caught the U.N. and the coalition
off guard. Both resisted initial calls for intervention on behalf of the
Kurds. The United States took the position that it could not intervene

37. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR Res. 1031 (1995) (authorizing IFOR).
38. For a detailed account of these events, see Mary Ellen O'Connell, ContinuingLimits
on UNIntervention in Civil War, 67 IND. L.J. 903, 904-09 (1992).
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militarily to support the uprisings because intervention would be
unlawful interference in Iraq's internal affairs.39 The French agreed
with this legal assessment, but argued that "[t]he law is one thing, but
the safeguard of a population is another, quite as precious, to which
humanity cannot be indifferent."4
France said it would try to get the law changed to allow
intervention. France could not, however, persuade the other
permanent members of the Security Council to authorize
force to liberate the Kurds. Instead, the Council ordered only
humanitarian aid on the Kurds' behalf. In Resolution 688,
the Council found that Iraqi attacks on the Kurds constituted
a threat to peace in the region ....In the subsequent operative paragraphs of the resolution, the Council called on Iraq
to end its repression of the Kurds and to allow international
humanitarian assistance to reach northern Iraq. This [was] as
far as the Council could go without inviting a Chinese veto
or failing to get the required two-thirds vote of the fifteenmember Council. As it was, China and India abstained from
supporting the resolution, while Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe
voted against it. All stated they believed the resolution
interfered in Iraq's internal affairs. 4
U.N. assistance in creating a new State for the Kurds would clearly
have challenged Iraq's autonomy. At first, the U.N. stopped short of
such a challenge-providing humanitarian aid is not considered to be
interference with internal affairs and therefore is not unlawful. Creating
the protective zone, however, went well beyond distributing humanitarian aid. There is a question whether such a move was really authorized
by the Security Council. The British have argued that Resolution 688,
read together with Resolution 678 (which authorized all means to bring
peace to the region), did provide authority to create the zone as part of
the response to Iraq's violation of international peace.42 It appears that
Iraq gave consent to the establishment of the zone in May, 1991. It was
then that Coalition forces left the area and United Nations "police"
entered.43 Subsequent cases more clearly defined the trend begun in
Iraq.

39. See id. at 905.
40. FINANCIAL TIMES, Apr. 5, 1991, at 4, col. 4 (Statement of French Foreign Minister
Roland Dumas).
41. O'Connell, supra note 38, at 905-06.
42. See id. at 906-07.
43. See id. at 909. See also MCCOUBREY & WHIRE, supranote 7, at 176.
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Yugoslavia

In mid-summer 1991, fighting broke out in Yugoslavia between
the province of Croatia, which had declared its independence, and the
Yugoslav federal government. This conflict also raised the question of
U.N. intervention in civil war.
In the early months of the war, the U.N. played no role. The
European Community (EC) wished to mediate the conflict, declaring it
a European matter. But the EC had not succeeded in getting a cease-fire
by mid-September. The Security Council then became involved,
beginning with Resolution 713, which imposed an arms embargo on the
entire territory of the former Yugoslavia. This embargo had the consent
of Belgrade, and thus avoided a Chinese veto. In November 1991,
Zagreb and Belgrade agreed to the formation of a peacekeeping force,
the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), to act as a buffer
under Resolution 743. To this point, no significant departures from
traditional peacekeeping practice are evident. However, Resolution 743
states that UNPROFOR was needed because "the situation in Yugoslavia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security."
There was no tangible threat to other independent States and it appeared
that this language was included with a possible view that UNPROFOR
would be more than a buffer, that it would be used to stop a civil war.
The Council oddly enough failed to give a clear mandate to that effect,
nor did it provide the resources to support such an effort. Indeed, the
later assessmentthat UNPROFORwas a failure is linked largely to what
is viewed as its unclear mandate.' By May 1992, the former Yugoslav
republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia were admitted to the United
Nations. The conflict became an international one and, as such, fell
under the traditional interpretation of the Charter in connection with the
former Yugoslavia. With the recognition of the three new States, the
dispute was clearly international, and no longer could be deemed an
internal affair of Yugoslavia. No longer were there any indications of
a new interpretationof the Charter that could infringe upon the value of
State autonomy.

44. See James B. Steinberg, International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict, in
ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 27, 40 (Lori F.
Damrosch ed., 1993) [hereinafter ENFORCING RESTRAINT].

1997]

C.

CONTINUING IMPORTANCE OFSTATE AUTONOMY

Somalia

On December 3, 1992, the Security Council authorized an action
similar to those undertaken in northern Iraq and at the beginning of the
Yugoslav crisis. In Resolution 794, the Council authorized "all
necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment
for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.... [T]he... magnitude
of the human tragedy in Somalia constitutes a threat to international
peace and security." As explained above, the authorizationofprotection
to humanitarian relief poses a minimal challenge to autonomy.
In Somalia, however, the Council again indicated a willingness to
reduce the limit of article 2(7) and expand its interpretationof article 39.
Under Resolution 814, the Council ordered troops wearing blue
helmets-some under U.N. command and others under U.S. command-to disarm warring parties and armed bands.45 Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali called this the first time the U.N. had used force for
"exclusively, humanitarian, internal reasons."
But the situation was not as clear-cut as that. In Somalia's case, it
was hard to accuse the U.N. of interfering with internal affairs when the
government had collapsed and chaos reigned. Even in that situation, the
U.N. had organized a conference of factional leaders in Addis Ababa to
get some sort of consent to the presence of the Blue Helmets.4 6
D.

Haiti

It was, therefore, only in Haiti that the Security Council clearly
went beyond the traditional Charter interpretation. In 1994, with
Resolution 940, the Security Council found that the situation in Haiti
threatened peace in the region. Yet, there was no threat to international
peace.47 A contingency of primarily American troops was authorized to
use armed force to restore democracy. Due to the efforts of former U.S.
President Jimmy Carter, force was not needed to oust the military
dictatorship. However, the finding of the Security Council that it could

45. See Ktihne, supra note 24, at 25.
46. See Lucia Mouat, UN. to Break New Ground in Planfor Peacekeepers in Somalia,
CHRSTAN SCENCE MONITOR, Mar. 16, 1993, at 2; Mark R. Hutchinson, Recent Development:
RestoringHope: UN. Security Council Resolutionsfor Somalia and an ExpandedDoctrine of
HumanitarianIntervention, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 624,626 (1993).
47. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Sovereignty and Community afterHaiti: Rethinking the
Collective Use of Force, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 70, 72 (1995).
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authorize military interventionto restore democracy-in a place where
a government was in effective control-is likely the zenith of the
Security Council's reinterpretation of the Charter. There was an
international concern in the case, namely the flight of refugees in small
boats from Haiti, but it never amounted to a threat to international
peace. The Security Council's position proclaimed that it could act
beyond the restrictions of "threats to international peace" and authorize
force to alter the internal affairs of a State.

IV.

AN END TO ACTIVISM

In his report, An Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General BoutrosGhali supported the expansionisttrend in the Security Council interpretation of the Charter. His report calls for enforcement action to respond
to human rights abuse and for nation-building. He developed ideas
already advanced by his predecessor, Perez de Cuellar:
The principle of non-interferencewith the essential domestic
jurisdiction of States cannot be regarded as a protective
barrier behind which human rights could be massively or
systematically violated with impunity .... We need not
impale ourselves on the horns of a dilemma between respect
for sovereignty and the protection of human rights .... What
is involved is not the right of intervention but the collective
obligation of States to bring relief and redress in human
rights emergencies."
Some believe that as a result of Iraq, Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Haiti,
the Charter has been permanently re-interpreted. They argue that the
Security Council may now intervene with military force to promote
democracy, human rights, self-determination, or other humanitarian
interests.49
Events since 1994, however, suggest a different conclusion. 0
Despite the Secretary-General's support and the precedents cited above,
the Council itself seems to be turning away from the expansionist

48. Quoted in Jarat Chopra, Back to the Drawing Board, 5 BULL ATOM. Scd. 29, 32
(Mar./April 1995).
49. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
50. See HELmuT FREUDENscHuB, BEscHLOSSE DES SICHERBEITSRATES DER VN NACH
KAPrrELXVII: ANSPRUCHUND WIRKLICHKEIT, (VORTRAGGEHALTEN IMRAHMBENDES WATrHERSCHOCKINGS-KOLLEGS INSTITUT FUR INTERNATIONALES RECHT ANDER UNIVERSITAT KIMEL

21, July 15, 1994).
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interpretation of the Charter. It has not responded to recent claims for
self-determination, or even complaints of massive human rights abuse,
when the interests of only one State have been involved. There have
always been voices resisting intervention in internal affairs, in particular
those of China, India, and several developing States." But since 1994,
others on the Council have joined this trend, certainly not only due to
the view of the drafters that intervention in internal affairs may escalate
to conflict, thus undermining the goal of peace. 52
The Council made no move to support the Chechen bid for selfdetermination with the authorization of military force, even though
some argue that their claim to self-determination is as good as that of
many other groups that have recently received the support of the
international community and the Security Council. 3 While Chechnya
directly concerned Russia and, therefore, there was the likelihood of
veto, many took the public position that it was an internal affair of
Russia in which the Council could not intervene beyond raising
concerns regarding human rights abuse.
Most spectacularly, the Security Council did nothing to stop the
slaughter in Rwanda in the spring of 1994. The Rwandan conflict
involved the crossing of many borders in the region. Moreover, the
U.N. already had consented to be there. Nevertheless, showing its new
reticence at becoming involved in such complicated conflicts, no
intervention was authorized. Rather, the peacekeepers who were there
were pulled out.54
Similarly, the conflict in Congo/Zaire had sufficient international
elements to justify intervention. Rebels crossed international borders;
and the opposing forces attacked refugee camps, humanitarian aid
workers, and aid shipments. Nevertheless, no U.N. mission ever went
forward. In late 1996, a Canadian-led multinational force got as far as
positioning an advance party in the area before it was declared unnecessary. Information-gathering flights, primarily by U.S. aircraft, were
utilized to assess the situation. The stated goal of the participants, who
51. "Increasingly vocal Chinese concern that the U.N.'s non-interference principle (Article
2.7) not be further weakened resonates with many other developing countries." Stremlau, supra
note 3, at 24. See also, Comments of Columbia, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess. At 6-8, U.N. Doc.
A/48/PV.41 (1993).
52. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
53. See Trent Tappe, Note, Chechnya and the State ofSelf-Determinationin a Breakaway
Region of the Former Soviet Union: Evaluatingthe Legitimacy of Secessionist Claims, 34
COLUtM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 255, 256 (1995).
54. See Winrich KOhne et al., WEU's Role in Crisis Management in Sub-SaharanAfrica,
22 CHAILLOT PAPERS 31 (Dec. 1995).
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included the U.S. and France, was to deliver humanitarian aid. Dr.
William Perry, then the U.S. Secretary of Defense, clearly stated that
robust rules of engagement would allow the troops self-defense,but that
the U.S. was "not planninga missionto disarm or separate refugees.""
The U.S. clearly intends to avoid a situation similar to that faced in
Somalia, where an expanded mandate involved it in a complicated intertribal feud, and resulted in the deaths of eighteen American servicemen
and the withdrawal of U.S. troops without any positive results. 6
If the Security Council is unwilling to become involved in these
conflicts, one seems safe in concluding that it will stay much farther
away from legally questionable interventions. 7
These developments can be explained by the fact that internal
conflict is far more factually complicated, in almost all cases, than
transboundary aggression. Determining whose cause the U.N. should
support-whose cause is worthy enough for troops to die for-has been
the heart of the problem. For the future, the Security Council will likely
concentrate again on ameliorating suffering, responding to international
conflict, and employing traditional Blue Helmet peacekeeping.5" Some
will argue that it is only the unwillingness of donor States to send troops
which explains why the Security Council is not authorizing nontraditional interventions. This explanation begs the question of why
States are unwilling to send troops. National leaders-certainly
American leaders-do not wish to send their citizens to die in morally
and legally ambiguous circumstances, of which civil strife is a prime
example. This fact was known to the drafters of the Charter and the
lesson was re-learned during te recent experience of Security Council
activism. 9
Has the Security Council's recent activism, nevertheless, had a
lasting impact on the accurate interpretation of the Charter? The
argument had been raised that while the Council's behavior may now

55. 600 US. Troops From Vicenza Expected to Join Zaire Mission, STARS AND STRIPES,
Nov. 15, 1996, at 1.
56. For a detailed account of events in Somalia, see Jeffrey Clark, Debacle in Somalia:
Failureof the CollectiveResponse, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT, supranote 44; see also THE NEW
INTERVENTIONISM 1991-1994 (James Mayal ed., 1996).
57. FreudenschuB, supranote 50, at 21.
58. See, e.g., Shashi Tharoor, Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'?, 37
SuRviVAL 52, 58 (1995/6).
59. Adam Roberts, The Road to Hell.. . A Critique ofHumanitarianIntervention, 1993
HARV. INT'LR. 10, 13 (Fall 1993).
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be more restrained, the legal situation is forever changed.60 The
argument is that, at least in legal theory if not in practical reality, the
Security Council now has the authority to order the use of force in
settings of non-intemationalarmed conflict. This is a difficult argument
to sustain.
It is true that practice may be used in the interpretationof treaties.6
In fact, some provisions of the U.N. Charter have been effectively
modified through practice. 62 Yet treaty-modifying practice consists of
repeated behavior, not just one unambiguous instance. Thus, while it
is appropriateto raise the possibility that the Charter has been modified,
to conclude that it actually has been changed would be an extreme
position.
A related argument is made by those who view the Security
Council as the ultimate fact-finder in determining what is "international
peace." The argument is that the Council may determine any situation
to be a threat to or breach of international peace-even wholly internal
conflicts. Now that it has done so, those situations remain classified as
threats to or breaches of internationalpeace. Such a view is rational but
is not consistent with the clear limitations placed on Security Council
action in the Charter. It is a body formed under the Charter and limited
by the Charter, including articles 2(7) and 39. It is not unfettered in
how it behaves and is not legally competent to declare that black is
red.63
The strongest response to both arguments raised above is evidence
coming from the Security Council itself. As already discussed, Security
Council members have themselves returned to the traditional interpretation of the Charter. If practice can change the Charter, the new
conservatism should suffice to change it back. If the Council is the
ultimate fact-finder, it is again looking for the crossing of an international boundary to authorize the use of force.

60. See Dr. Georg Nolte, Remarks at the Workshop Interveningfor Peace, Center for
Applied Policy in Munich, Germany (Jan. 24, 1997).
61. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(3)(b), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 340.
62. See Ian Brownlie, The Decisions ofPoliticalOrgans of the United Nations and the
Rule of Law, in ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF WANG TIEYA 91, 100-02 (Ronald St. John Macdonald
ed., 1994); Michael Reisman, The ConstitutionalCrisisin the UnitedNations, 87 AM. J. INT'L
L. 83, 96 (1993).
63. See, e.g., Frederic L. Kirgis, The Security Council'sFirstFifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 506, 537-38 (1995).
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The point needs to be made with precision: human rights are a
matter of international concern; human rights abuse breaches peace.
Unless, however, an international boundary is crossed, or there is a
threat that it will be crossed, the abuse of human rights is not a threat or
breach of internationalpeace. Very often serious human rights abuse
does lead to breaches of international peace. That has been the case in
Affica's Great Lakes region, in South East Asia, and in southern Africa.
In all of these cases, the Security Council ordered-or could have
ordered-mandatory action. Where international peace is not threatened, recommendations of action short of force are the maximum lawful
action. 64
It is also very possible that the next few years will see a change in
the structure of the Security Council. All of the most likely scenarios
would tend to favor a return to non-interference with the domestic
affairs of States. For example, should the Security Council add five
permanent seats (though probably non-veto holding), three are likely to
go to developing countries. These are the very States most likely to
experience internal strife and least likely to support intervention to sort
out such conflicts, at least when wholly in one State.
The result will be that the Security Council will again place the
value of peace through respect for State autonomy over other Charter
values. Not everyone agrees with this ordering. But it is consistent
with Professor Henkin's clear analysis of the teleology of the Charter.

64. See Mary Ellen O'Connell, The Enforcement of International Law (forthcoming).

